INTRODUCTION
The focus of risk research shifted considerably in the 1970s (Blascovich and Ginsburg 1974; Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein 1979; Fischhoff et al. 1978; Starr 1969) . Previously, risk assessment had centered on the expected harms of events (e.g., mortality), but then researchers built a foundation of evidence for how perceptions of risk varied across social contexts (Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein 1983; 1987; . At this time, researchers also started studying the differences between public and expert understandings of risk-as exemplified by Paul Slovic's quote in the epigraph to this thesis. Collectively, these studies revealed a range of variables that differed between the two groups' evaluations of risks, especially in the extent to which value judgments and the voluntariness of exposure to risks matter to assessment (Slovic 2000) . Although much of this research began in psychology, sociologists and anthropologists also contributed to risk research's paradigm shift by studying how different social factors influence individuals' risk perceptions (Blascovich and Ginsburg 1974; Clarke 1988; Clarke and Short 1993; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Freudenburg and Pastor 1992; Short 1984) , including how groups' worldviews and goals shape group members' understandings and negotiations of risk (Clarke 1988; Edwards and von Winterfeldt 1987; Fischhoff, Watson and Hope 1984; Short 1987) .
Recently, sociological research on risk has focused on organizations' responses to risk perceptions (Chou and Liou 2010; Lakoff and Klinenberg 2010; Sharkey and Bromley 2014; Vasi and King 2012; Zinn 2009 ). For example, Vasi and King (2012) find that corporations that are targeted by activists are perceived to be more risky than untargeted firms, and such perceptions can then negatively affect the financial performance of such corporations. Risk perceptions also affect organizations indirectly. Compared to organizations in fields less assessed 2 by third-party risk evaluators, organizations in widely assessed fields engage in less risky actions (Sharkey and Bromley 2014) . Although these studies capture organizational reactivity to risk perceptions, they overlook how individuals respond to perceived organizational risks. For example, we may expect individuals to avoid the goods and services of supposedly risky organizations, but other social judgments of organizations (e.g., reputations) likely factor into their risk aversion independently from their risk perceptions. In what circumstances may these social judgments moderate risk perceptions? Is aversion dependent on which organization is involved in the risk? These questions are important not only because they draw closer the ties between sociology and risk research at the organizational and individual levels, but because addressing them can further our understanding of organizational behavior and social movements that target organizations. This paper bridges the organizational-individual gap by merging psychological theories on risk perception with social psychological theories on legitimacy and status. Data from the 2006 General Social Survey are used to test theoretical propositions in the context of how individuals' aversion to genetically modified foods (GMOs) relates to their perceptions of organizational risks among business leaders, medical researchers, and political officials who are involved with producing, evaluating, and regulating GMOs. Additionally, two interactions are evaluated: first, how perceptions of medical researchers' ignorance and uncertainty of GMOs' risks interact in rejecting GMOs; and then how individuals' deferral of political influence to medical researchers moderates aversion to GMOs among individuals who believe that industry scientists are disreputable. Whereas qualitative research has repeatedly found that individuals who reject GMOs typically view the organizations connected with them (e.g., Monsanto) to be disreputable (Niiler 1999; Ruch and Zaloznaya 2016; Schurman 2004; Schurman and Munro 3 2006; Shiva 2007) , this paper is the first known study to quantitatively assess how such judgments relate to individuals' decisions to eat GMOs. In doing so, it also makes substantive and theoretical contributions to the literature on these social movements and others like them.
THEORY AND BACKGROUND

Risk Perceptions, Reputations, and Deferring Influence
Risk is the severity and likelihood of an event (Slovic 1998) . Genuine risks must be adverse and common enough to warrant serious precautions, such as those that we take to avoid car crashes while driving. Dangerous but extremely rare events are not risky, per se, but are tragedies because they are more or less beyond the realm of expectation. Likewise, trivially harmful but common events, such as embarrassment, do not exemplify risk because they fail to evoke the same kind of precaution as more harmful scenarios do. Slovic (1987) argues that individuals perceive risks along two core dimensions: dread and the unknown. Dread risk includes the type of event that causes potential risks, the event's specific consequences, and how voluntary and controlled individuals' exposure to an event is. The risk of being a victim of terrorism is more dreadful than the risk of stubbing one's toe, and a risk that one takes voluntarily will likely be perceived as less severe than one encountered involuntarily. Unknown risk, on the other hand, includes the extent to which a potentially risky event can be known and predicted. Generally, new and unpredictable risks are perceived to be more severe than old and well-known risks. This is because we usually have greater knowledge of how to successfully avoid the latter kind of risks. In situ, risk perceptions intertwine dread and the unknown simultaneously, both directly and indirectly (e.g., through the secondary consequences of the risk).
Given the role of dread and knowledge in risk perceptions, risk is largely constructed (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Short 1984) . The meanings and practices that we learn through socialization help us define what is potentially risky and what is acceptable or beneficial for us (Fischhoff, Watson and Hope 1984; Hunter and Fewtrell 2001) . Food rules, for example, are transmitted through generations and can be as simple as "Don't eat rotten food" to more complex warnings about what foods to avoid when one is ill (Matsuo and Yoshikura 2014) . The voluntariness of risk exposure is similarly constructed. Laws, for example, are made in part to reduce certain risks (Short 1997) , and social justice also shapes risk perceptions when we are critical of some groups being disproportionally exposed to higher levels of risk than others (Jondle et al. 2013; Tierney 1999) . Beyond the minutiae of everyday risks, some risks may signal larger social problems, which we may amplify or attenuate depending on our goals and motives in the situation (Kasperson and Kasperson 1996) . Risks that could harm many in socially significant ways are typically amplified, which then motivates individuals to act to lessen the risk of their reoccurrence (Slovic 1987; Slovic 2000) . After September 11 th , 2001, for example, airports across the U.S. increased their security substantially to prevent similar catastrophes from happening again. Secondary risks were also foreshadowed at this time, such as wars and political conflicts in the Middle East, and attention was drawn to the tensions that may have precipitated the attacks, including the cultural and economic problems of globalization (Burke 2004) .
With this background in mind, three concepts from sociological social psychology can further our understanding of how organizational risks are perceived and how they can influence behavior. These theories are briefly described in the remainder of this section. First, legitimacy theory's (Berger et al. 1998; Bitektine 2011; Johnson, Dowd and Ridgeway 2006; Zelditch 2006) propositions about authority, validity, and propriety in the use of power overlap with theories 5 about the significance of control, voluntariness, and equity in risk perceptions. Organizational risks fit into this theoretical framework well because they are often authorized or validated by government agencies. Social pressure to address organizational risks may not materialize if the majority of citizens believe they are valid and proper. Impropriety, however, may not increase perceptions of risk either if a risk is created for the larger social good-versus self-interest.
Merging legitimacy and risk theories, then, would lead us to predict that organizational risks resulting from self-interest are more likely to be delegitimated and challenged compared to those that follow from actions to promote social welfare.
Given their connection to legitimacy (Berger et al. 1998; Zhou 2005) (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982) . Similarly, withholding social influence from others may indicate that one believes the others have low status (Berger, Cohen and Zelditch 1972; Berger, Ridgeway and Zelditch 2002) . Therefore, individuals' deferral and withholding of social influence may relate to how they perceive risks, as deferring influence may be an endorsement of others and may signify they are not perceived to be risky, especially 6 because voluntarily giving others (including organizations) the ability to influence risks that effect oneself requires one to give up some control of the situation.
Altogether, legitimacy, status, and deferment may be negatively associated with perceived risk, and they may interact to do so. In the next section, I explain how GMOs and the organizations that are involved with them showcase many of the abovementioned concepts and processes. In doing so, I will outline why some individuals perceive GMOs to be risky and how the organizations that develop, evaluate, and regulate GMOs may exacerbate or attenuate the perceived risks of GMOs.
GMOs, Organizations, and Social Contentions
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are plants, animals, or other beings that have had their genetic information altered to achieve some end. Some individuals, however, argue that GMOs pose known and unknown risks to humans and 7 ecosystems (Hilbeck et al. 2015; Schurman and Munro 2006) . They argue that the U.S. should be precautious in developing and distributing GMOs until more is known about them, and that U.S.
policies should resemble those in Europe, which strictly regulate GMOs' sale and labeling (Gaskell et al. 1999; Löfstedt, Fischhoff and Fischhoff 2002; Schurman 2004 ).
Further research and stronger regulations on GMOs may not be enough for some individuals, however. Many people completely reject GMOs and want them banned (Shiva 2007) . Social movements against GMOs, for instance, were mobilized before GMOs first entered U.S. markets in 1996 (Niiler 1999; Schurman 2004; Schurman and Munro 2006) . In other words, almost everyone buys their food from grocery stores and other markets, where the average food item may have traveled 1,500 miles or more before it reached the consumer who eventually bought it (Pullman and Wu 2012) . Policies and coordination plans that range from the international and national levels (e.g., those in the Farm Bill) to the local level are 8 necessary to help assure that Americans have access to food. In other words, food systems are densely structured networks of institutional and organizational actors.
Three types of organizations shape the roles that GMOs play in our food systems. The first includes the businesses and industries that develop, produce, and sell GMOs. Biotechnology firms such as Monsanto currently have low reputations among the general public for many of the reasons mentioned earlier (Niiler 1999; Shiva 2007) . In fact, a 2014 Nielsen poll of Americans found that Monsanto had the third-lowest reputation among the most visible companies (The Nielsen Company 2014). Beyond biotechnology companies, the food industry in general also falls into this category since it distributes and sells genetically modified foods.
The next set of organizational actors includes the scientists and medical researchers who evaluate GMOs. This group can come from government, public, and private institutions. Over one thousand studies have been published about GMOs to date, and overall there is no evidence that GMOs pose unique risks exceeding those of other agricultural production methods (Nicolia et al. 2013) . In 2012, however, concerns about GMOs' risks were raised when Gilles-Eric Séralini and his research team (2012) found a high incidence of tumors and mortality among rats who ate GM corn. Shortly after its publication, Séralini and colleagues' article was retracted from the journal in which it was published, Food and Chemical Toxicology (Elsevier and Jendrysik 2013) . This situation created a scandal for those debating the status of GMOs, and the journal and its editors were accused of pro-GMO bias when supporters of the paper claimed that Séralini violated none of the journal's official guidelines for legitimately retracting an article (Ruch and Zaloznaya 2016) . Instead, the article was retracted because it drew conclusions that were unsupported by the study's design, size, and methodology. Séralini accused the journal of suppressing studies that find deleterious effects from GMOs and for being uncritical of studies 9 that find neutral or beneficial outcomes, echoing a critique frequently forwarded by others in the anti-GMO movement (Antoniou, Robinson and Fagan 2012; Butler 2012) .
While the Séralini affair is not a direct concern of this study, it illuminates many of the social dimensions involved in perceptions of GMOs' risks. One year after the scandal, a video of astrophysicist Neil DeGrasse Tyson (2014) 
HYPOTHESES
The previous section discussed various ways in which business leaders, scientists, medical and researchers, and policy makers have been contentious in developing, evaluating, and regulating GMOs. Many of these conflicts stemmed from allegedly illegitimate and disreputable events. By combining social psychological theories on these concepts with theories on risk perceptions, we may better address the core concern of this paper: how social judgments of organizations are related to individuals' risk aversion independently from their perceptions of organizational risks. Next, I derive six hypotheses to inform different parts of this question.
The first set of hypotheses relates to individuals' perceptions of organizational risk.
Because risk perceptions are multidimensional (Slovic 1987) and systematically linked to uncertainty (May 2001; Zinn 2006) , and because uncertainty negatively affects actors' status in task-relevant situations (Lynn, Podolny and Tao 2009; Zhou 2005) , I hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: Beliefs that organizations are ignorant of risks will be positively associated with one's avoidance of such risks, all else equal.
Hypothesis 2: Beliefs that organizations are uncertain of risks will be positively associated with one's avoidance of such risks, all else equal.
Hypothesis 3:
Beliefs that organizations are ignorant and uncertain of risks will interact synergistically and be positively related with one's avoidance of such risks, all else equal.
Because risks are largely constructed (Fischhoff, Watson and Hope 1984; Short 1984) , the next set of hypotheses involve reputation and deference. The risks we accept and reject can reflect how we wish to structure our social lives (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982) . Individuals who wish to separate themselves from disreputable others may exaggerate certain risks. As such, the risks of disreputable others may be judged particularly severely. On the other hand, people are more likely to accept risks that are created by those others whom they approve of (Su et al. 2015) . The voluntariness of being exposed to risks is another factor that influences risk perceptions (Slovic 1987) . Individuals accept risks more when they consent to being exposed to them (Starr 1969) . Therefore, deferring the ability to influence and control risks to another actor may signify a greater willingness to accept those risks:
Hypothesis 4: One's perceptions of organizational disreputation will be positively associated with one's risk aversion, all else equal.
Hypothesis 5: One's willingness to defer social influence to organizations to control risks will be negatively associated with one's risk aversion, all else equal.
Hypothesis 6:
Deferring social influence to an organization will moderate and attenuate the relationship between the organization's disreputation and one's risk aversion, all else equal. The dependent variable to be modeled is one's willingness to eat GM food. (Please see
RESEARCH DESIGN
Data and the Dependent Variable
Appendix Item 1 for select variable definitions.) Participants were given three responses to this question ("I don't care whether or not the food I eat has been genetically modified," "I am willing to eat genetically modified foods, but would prefer unmodified foods if they are available," and "I will not eat food that I know has been genetically modified"); however, I
merged the "I don't care…" and "I am willing…" responses to create a binary variable splitting individuals who are willing to eat GMOs and those who refuse to eat GMOs. This reflects the study's aims of testing relationships with risk-related behaviors-whether or not an individual acts in a certain way to avoid a risk, not if they think a certain way about a risk. That being said, ordered logit models were nearly equivalent to the binary logit models presented later.
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Independent Variables
Risk perception variables.
-Hypothesis 1 will be tested using variables that measure the perceived ignorance of three organizational actors' (business leaders, medical researchers, and elected officials) understanding of GMOs' risks. Responses to these items were measured using a five-item scale that ranges from "Very well" to "Not at all." The fourth risk perception variable measures the extent to which participants believe medical researchers agree on the risks and benefits of GMOs (i.e., is there uncertainty?). Responses to this question were measured by a five-item scale that ranged from "Near complete agreement" to "No agreement at all."
Unfortunately, this agreement question was not asked about business leaders or elected officials; therefore, Hypothesis 2 will only be tested in reference to medical researchers. To test the interaction in Hypothesis 3, a variable was created from the product of the ignorance and agreement variables referencing medical researchers. All integer and ordinal variables were mean-centered to ease the interpretation of interactions. Responses indicating that industry scientists are disreputable ranged from "Strongly agree" to "Strongly disagree" on a four-item scale.
14 Deferral variables.-The last group of variables assessed participants' deference of political influence to each of the organizations to regulate GMOs. Responses could vary along a four-item response scale that ranged from "A great deal of influence" to "None at all." These variables will be used to test Hypothesis 5. The interaction in Hypothesis 6 will be tested by the product variable of deference to medical researchers and the industry scientists' disreputation variable described above.
Control Variables
Individuals -Smith et al. 1999; Hammond 2010) . To control for each of these sociodemographic effects, sex, race, income (log-transformed), age, and education will be modeled. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations for these variables and others.
Knowledge of science has also been found to correlate positively with accepting GMOs (Ceccoli and Hixon 2012; Knight 2007; Zhu and Xie 2015) . To measure this variable, I graded participants' responses to fifteen right-or-wrong science questions that were included on the GSS (e.g., True or false: "It is the father's gene that decides whether the baby is a boy or a girl?").
This score variable ranged from zero to fifteen. Another variable that may relate to GMO aversion is individuals' generalized trust (Alaszewski and Coxon 2009; McKenna 2001) , which was measured using one's response to a question on whether most people can be trusted. Lastly, a proxy measure for one's sense of environmentalism was modeled based on participants' belief of whether the government spends too much, too little, or just the right amount of money on improving and protecting the environment. While this proxy is not the most valid measure of environmentalism, controlling for environmental attitudes is critical due to their strong relationship with anti-GMO ideologies (Cooley, Goreham and Youngs Jr 2004) .
Analyses
Because the dependent variable for rejecting GMOs is binary, I use logistic regression models to test my six hypotheses (see Equation 1 for the models' structure, where Ω is the odds of rejecting GMOs, is a vector of independent variables, is a unit change in variable , and is the coefficient of change for variable per ). All models were analyzed using Stata's Lastly, while they are not shown, alternate models were also analyzed which assessed the effects of other covariates (e.g., zeal for science and technology). These models' results were similar to the models presented below. Model 2 builds on Model 1 by adding perceptions of industry scientists' disreputation and all medical researcher variables. Again, we find that being female (p < .001), Black (p < .05), or an environmentalist (p < .1) increases the odds of rejecting GMOs. Greater knowledge of science (p < .01) also retains its relationship with accepting GMOs. Education, however, is no longer associated with accepting GMOs. Because the relationships between these baseline sociodemographic variables and individuals' rejection of GMOs remain fairly stable across all of the models, I will no longer discuss them in the following models. Among the medical researcher variables in Model 2, only perceived ignorance among medical researchers on GMOs' risks is associated with rejecting GMOs (p < .01). Neither perceptions of medical researchers' disagreement on GMOs' risks nor their respective self-interestedness or deference variables were related to GMO aversion. Finally, the perceived disreputation of industry scientists is associated with rejecting GMOs (p < .01). Because this variable references public scientists (by contrast), who may affiliate with government organizations in addition to universities, it will also be included in the models that test organizational variables for business and policy leaders. Model 3 tests organizational variables referencing business leaders. None are significant at the .05 alpha level; however, perceptions of industry scientists' disreputation continue to be associated with rejecting GMOs (p < .05). The organizational variables that are added Model 4 reference policy makers. Only the perceived self-interestedness of policy makers is related to GMO aversion (p < .01). Again, perceptions of industry scientists' disreputation is associated with rejecting GMOs (p < .05).
1: Ω( , + ) Ω( , ) = exp( )
RESULTS
Model 5 includes all of the organizational variables from Models 2 to 4. Surprisingly, the only organizational variable to approach a significant association with rejecting GMOs is the perceived ignorance of medical researchers on GMOs' potential risks (p < .10). Beliefs about industry scientists' disreputability continue to predict individuals' rejection of GMOs (p < .01).
Model 6 adds two interaction variables to Model 5, including the interaction between perceptions of medical researches' ignorance and medical researchers' disagreement and the interaction between the deference that one is willing to give to medical researchers to regulate GMOs and the perceived disreputation of industry scientists. Both interactions are significant at or below the .05 alpha level.
Given the complexity involved in explaining interactional effects, especially when they are nonlinear, Figures 1 and 2 display the outcomes graphically as the predicted probability of rejecting GMOs (and as not the odds ratios that are presented in Model 6). Figure 1 shows that individuals who believe that medical researchers are both ignorant and uncertain of GMOs' risks are especially likely to reject GMOs. In contrast, individuals who perceive medical researchers as being highly knowledgeable about GMOs' risks are nearly unaffected by perceived uncertainty. None Much more often than those who perceive them to be reputable. As the willingness to defer political influence to medical researchers increases, the probability of rejecting GMOs decreases. In fact, the differences between those who attribute negative and positive reputations to industry scientists disappear statistically among individuals who are willing to concede much influence to medical researchers.
Before moving onto the next section, a few notes about model fit are worthwhile. First, according to Akaike and Bayesian Information Criterion, Model 6 fits the data better than the other models, and thus including the two interactions improves prediction. Appendix Item 3
lists the classification statistics for this model, which correctly classified 75% of the cases. More specifically, the model had far greater specificity (94%) than sensitivity (31%), and a higher negative predictive value (76%) than positive predictive value (67%). The model's greater accurately in predicting cases of accepting GMO may be because 70% of its sample reported eating GMOs: out of 654 cases, 459 ate GMOs and 195 refused. Because logistic regression models use maximum likelihood estimation, more data increases accuracy, and 195 rejecters may not be enough for their accurate estimation. Along a different vein, it should be noted that variables for political ideologies were not modeled because they were not significant and had no effect on any other covariate. Religious ideology was not modeled either because it was not of theoretical interest. Whereas this variable was associated with rejecting GMOs (odds ratio = 1.43, z = -6.31, p < .001), and it did not change the significance of any other covariate. Finally, Wald tests on the joint significance of all variables in the business and policy leader variable sets did not give evidence to recommend eliminating either set (p = .641 and .313, respectively).
22
DISCUSSION
The results of these models demonstrate that individuals' decisions to reject GMOs cannot be explained by a single factor. Females and individuals who identify as Black, for example, were consistently more likely to reject GMOs compared to men and Whites (by probabilities of 12% and 18%, respectively); moreover, the odds ratios for these variables changed little from Model 1 to Model 6, despite the addition of risk variables. Similarly, individuals with a high knowledge of science were more likely to accept GMOs across every model. For example, a half-standard deviation change in science knowledge at the mean was associated with a 6% increase in the probability of accepting GMOs, and the maximum change in science knowledge was associated with a 29% increase. Though individuals who support
GMOs often critique rejecters for lacking a nuanced understanding of biotechnology (Kuntz 2012) , the results found here demonstrate that one's knowledge is not the only important factor in predicting aversion to GMOs. The perceived disreputation of industry scientists also has a substantial association with one's decision to reject GMOs. Even if one had the maximum science knowledge score, a completely negative perception of industry scientists' reputation leads to a 27% probability of rejecting GMOs, ii which eliminates the statistically significant relationship that the highest science knowledge has with accepting GMOs (by linear combination: odds ratio = .716, z = -.48, p = .682). These results generally match those of a recent experiment which used educational materials to attenuate the perceived risks of and negative attitudes toward GMOs (Zhu and Xie 2015) ; however, the study did not assess individuals' perceptions of organizational actors' reputations or legitimacy, and so it may have missed key moderators in whose attitudes may change the most and least over time.
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As a whole, the models give mixed evidence for the hypotheses. In regard to Hypothesis 1 and 2, the main effects of individuals' beliefs about organizational ignorance and uncertainty about GMOs' potential risks are inconsistently related with rejecting GMOs, and these associations only exist for the medical research variables. The interaction of perceived ignorance and disagreement, however, is significant and supports Hypothesis 3. When both variables are at their highest values, and all else is at its mean, the probability of rejecting GMOs is 60%. These findings are similar to previous studies that found ignorance and uncertainty about risks to interact synergistically (Alaszewski and Brown 2007; Zinn 2006) . In addition, in cases where risks are unknown and contested, and where it is unlikely that one will gain from exposing oneself to any level of risk, abiding by the precautionary principle and engaging in risk aversion makes sense (Löfstedt, Fischhoff and Fischhoff 2002) . On the other hand, if one believes that there is much knowledge about the risks and benefits of a situation, then they may perceive these risks to be more legitimate and acceptable and therefore may be more likely to voluntarily engage in a risky situation-as legitimacy theories find in power research (Berger et al. 1998; Johnson, Dowd and Ridgeway 2006; Zelditch 2006 Whereas previous research finds that in these cases disagreement is more problematic than uncertainty, the interaction presented in Figure 1 gives evidence that disagreement may not affect the probability of avoiding risks if perceived knowledge is high.
Hypothesis 4, which concerned organizational reputations, received little support from the self-interest variables. Of all the organizational actors, only perceptions of self-interested policy makers were associated with aversion to GMOs, and this association disappeared in
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Model 5. On the other hand, Hypothesis 4 received much support from the variable on industry scientists' disreputation. This variable was consistently associated with one's rejection of GMOs, and it had the second largest magnitude of effect of all the variables in Model 6 (the fullystandardized logged odds coefficient, which is not presented, was .10, versus science knowledge's .15). It also makes sense in relation to the social contentions that have historically surrounded biotechnology companies (Niiler 1999; Ruch and Zaloznaya 2016; Shiva 2007 ).
Hypothesis 5, however, received little support from the organizational variables. Only deferring to medical researchers was related to one's rejection of GMOs through its interaction in Model 6.
These results may mean that the willingness to defer influence to an organization is more complicated in risky situations, especially when uncertainty exists (Lynn, Podolny and Tao 2009) , or that we only care about how certain organizations being able to influence risks. Status and legitimacy may help explain these gaps (Berger, Cohen and Zelditch 1972; Berger et al. 1998; Berger, Ridgeway and Zelditch 2002; Johnson, Dowd and Ridgeway 2006; Zelditch 2006 ).
Hypothesis 6 tested how status and legitimacy affect deferral in potentially risky situations. Model 6 gives support to this hypothesis through the interaction between deferring political influence to medical researchers and perceiving industry scientists' disreputability.
Whereas individuals who were unwilling to defer any influence to researchers had widely different probabilities of rejecting GMOs, based on the statuses they attributed to scientists, individuals who willingly deferred influence to researchers were equally likely to accept GMOs, no matter what status they attributed to scientists. This convergence may occur even though differences in status exist since the researchers are still taking on an acceptable and legitimate role. Legitimacy theory would then argue that disreputation would not lead to contention in 25 absence of other factors, such as self-interestedness (Johnson, Dowd and Ridgeway 2006; Zelditch 2006 ). Therefore, we should not expect one's perceptions of or aversion to risk to be amplified in this case (Kasperson and Kasperson 1996) .
CONCLUSION
Sociologists have long argued that organizations' roles in exacerbating and attenuating risks need to be studied (Clarke and Short 1993; Short 1987; Tierney 1999; Zinn 2009 ). This paper contributes to that goal in three ways. First, it bridges risk perception theories (Fischhoff et al. 1978; Slovic 2000) with sociological theories about legitimacy (Johnson, Dowd and Ridgeway 2006; Zelditch 2006) , status (Berger, Cohen and Zelditch 1972; Ridgeway et al. 1998) , and social influence to improve our understanding of why some individuals may avoid potentially risky situations-in this case, eating genetically modified foods. Second, it tested whether social judgments of organizations remain associated with risk aversion after organizational risk variables are modeled. The models' results give evidence that they do stay significant. Lastly, the findings fill gaps in sociological research on organizational risk perceptions that overlook how individuals' risk behaviors are affected by their perceptions of organizations (Chou and Liou 2010; Lakoff and Klinenberg 2010; Sharkey and Bromley 2014; Vasi and King 2012; Zinn 2009 ). Since perceptions of organizational actors' legitimacy, status, and reputation are related to rejection of GMOs even after controlling for key risk perception variables, organizations may need to do more than create safer environments when they respond to risks (Sharkey and Bromley 2014; Vasi and King 2012) . The reciprocal engagement between organizations' and individuals' responses to risk perceptions should be studied in future research,
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as these social psychological variables and others may drive the social amplifications of risk (Kasperson and Kasperson 1996) that shape the course of these actors' future risk behaviors. This paper's results also add to risk perception literature on the multidimensionality of risks perceptions (Slovic 2000) , as shown by the interaction between ignorance and uncertainty about GMOs' risks and the interaction between the perceived disreputation of industry scientists and one's willingness to defer political influence to medical researchers. These findings exemplify how individuals' decisions to reject GMOs cannot be reduced to a single topic like risk. Other concerns, including reputations and legitimacy, are also important and in some cases moderate and cancel out the effects of other risk perception variables such as knowledge of the situation.
The variables used to operationalize organizational risks and reputations could be improved substantially since individuals' own beliefs and feelings about GMOs' harms were not measured. Instead, these ideas were inferred from respondents' reported behavior. In addition,
given the research (Kahan 2015; Starr 1969) on differences between expressed risk preferences (such as those assessed here) and revealed preferences (e.g., those shown through other behaviors, such as shopping habits), and other research (Mills, Reyna and Estrada 2008) which finds a weak fit between self-reported risk perceptions and behaviors and one's actual behaviors, we must take caution in interpreting these results. Whereas GMOs were defined and explained to respondents, some of the individuals who reported always rejecting GMOs may have actually consumed them regularly. Similarly, given the cross-sectional structure of the dataset, it is impossible to tell whether the negative reputations that individuals attribute to organizations lead them to reject GMOs or if individuals' rejection of GMOs develops for other reasons (e.g., their
27 moral worldviews or their disgust of GMOs), which then lead them to avoid organizations affiliated with GMOs. Experimental studies may assess these questions better than surveys can.
Overall, though a decade has passed since these data were collected, the results' overall generalizability should not be diminished. In 1999, Niiler's (1999) (2000) have also published articles and books about the controversies surrounding GMOs before and after this period. These studies exemplify how GMOs have been a contentious topic for decades. Since this paper is the first known study to quantitatively assess how individuals' rejection of GMOs relates to their perceptions of different organizations, it makes key contributions these social movement literatures on GMOs. As other social contentions related to GMOs continue to arise in public discourse (e.g., the labeling of GMOs), the results of this paper may help us to better understand consumers' responses to them. In addition, this paper's findings and arguments may inform theories and empirical assessments of similar social contentions, including those concerning vaccination and climate change, as they too likely involve networks of organizational and institutional actors.
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ENDNOTES
i An ordered logit model (predicting the responses of a complete approval of eating GMOs, a willingness to eat GMOs while preferring not to, and a complete refusal to eat GMOs) analogous to the covariate structure of the binary logit model tested in Model 6 found support for Hypotheses 6, but not Hypothesis 3. Whereas a Brant test found no significant evidence for the parallel regression assumption's violation ( 2 = 19.43, = 22, = .619), this test did find that the coefficients for perceived ignorance among medical researchers and for the interaction between this variable and perceived agreement among medical researcher were both significantly different between the ordinal predictor's two cut points. Specifically, the logit coefficient for perceived ignorance became smaller from aversion to GMOs increased across cut points (from .395 to .036; 2 = 5.04, = 1, = .025), and the interaction logit coefficient became larger (from -.051 to .204; 2 = 4.30, = 1, = .038). All other coefficients were similar across cut points (p > .10). Therefore, should one wish to read the models presented as if they were ordinal logit models, then they could instead interpret the odds ratios as representing increasing or decreasing steps of aversion to GMOs-noting, of course, the differences that are described above.
ii The predicted probabilities of rejecting GMOs based on the maximum and minimum science knowledge scores and highest and lowest perceptions of scientists' reputations are as follows: Notes: a = Changes were estimated using Stata's prchange command (Long and Freese 2014) . b = Categorical variables are not mean-centered; Pr( | ) = 27.4%. Table 2 , Model 6's Dependent Variable (Rejected GMOs). 
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